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TOWARD NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES: THE SEC'S
DISCHARGE OF ITS TRI-FUNCTIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES*
Edward H. Fleischman "

The subject matter of this essay is ever-evolving, ever-evocative of the
conflicting currents that buffet the independent federal regulatory agencies,
and ever-provactive of angry disagreement. I believe, therefore, that it is
ever-timely.
More than a half century ago, President Franklin Roosevelt, in transmitting to Congress the report of a special commission on administrative management, the Brownlow Committee Report,2 used the phrase "a headless
'fourth branch' of the [g]overnment" to describe independent regulatory
commissions.' The report he sent to Capitol Hill in January, 1937, included
a summary paragraph, which is where this discussion begins.
In the language of the President's report:
These independent [regulatory] commissions have been given
broad powers to explore, formulate, and administer policies of regulation; they have been given the task of investigating and prosecuting business misconduct; they have been given powers, similar
to those exercised by courts of law, to pass in concrete cases upon
the rights and liabilities of individuals under the statutes. They are
in reality miniature independent governments set up to deal with
[in those times] the railroad problem, the banking problem, or the
* This Essay is an adaptation of a talk Edward Fleischman delivered at the first in an
occasional series of Catholic University of America Securities Issues Forum. The Securities
Alumni Practice Group of the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America
sponsored the Forum, which was held in September 1992, in Washington, D.C.
** Mr. Fleischman is a partner in the New York law firm, Rosenman & Colin. From
1986 to 1992, Mr. Fleischman served as a commissioner at the United States Securities Exchange Commission.
1. For instance, the issue of the Administrative Law Review published just before oral
presentation of this Essay explored the potential of administrative grand juries, which has a
direct bearing on this discussion. See Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative Grand Ju-

ries?, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 465 (1992).
2. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE
COMM. WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1937) [hereinafter BROWNLOW COMMITTEE REPORT].

3. Id. at 40.
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radio problem. They constitute a headless "fourth branch" of the
Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies, and
uncoordinated powers. . . . The Congress has found no effective
way of supervising them, they cannot be controlled by the President, and they are answerable to the courts only in respect to the
legality of their activities.4
Since Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,5 the courts' self-imposed mandate for deference has eaten deeply into President Roosevelt's belief that there was or is agency answerability to the courts with respect to the
legality of the agencies' own activities. And, for ill or for good, the agencies'
independence from the direct intervention of the Congress and of the President has continued to this very day.
Still, whether because of or without regard to Chevron, in our constitutional republic founded on the notion of limited federal powers and steeply
biased in favor of fair process as the safeguard of the citizenry, that very
independence elicits an examination of the exercise by these agencies of the
powers bestowed upon them.
Let me repeat what those powers are: to formulate general policies of regulation; to administer those policies and investigate and prosecute violations
of those policies; and to pass, in concrete cases, upon the rights and liabilities
of individuals accused of such violations-quasi-legislative, quasi-executive,
and quasi-judicial powers.
But to use the "quasi" power terminology carries connotations which perhaps advantage the argument and viewpoint of this Essay. So I shall try to
use a more neutral formulation and shall narrow my focus to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), not only because it is the paradigm of
agencies but because I speak out of experience principally in practice before,
and only in service with, the SEC.
The tri-functional model of federal administrative authority, of which the
SEC is but one example, combines policymaking and enforcement activities,
characteristic of the legislative and executive branches of the federal constitutional structure, with adjudicatory responsibilities substantively akin to
those of the judicial branch. It is the impact of that combination on the
SEC's discharge of its adjudicatory responsibilities, particularly taking into
account practical developments affecting policymaking by the SEC, that is
the subject of this Essay.
4. Id. at 39-40.

5. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the
Supreme Court held that where Congress did not express its intent on the precise issue at
hand, the courts should defer to the interpretation evidenced in agency regulations. Id. at 84245. Agencies assert interpretations evidenced by other kinds of agency action, i.e., internal

agency action, as well in order to merit the same Chevron-type deference from the courts.
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It is not enough to recite the generality that the SEC "must combine its
judicial work with work of policy-determination," as the Brownlow Committee suggested in 1937.6 Some account of the extent of intersection between those two functions and, similarly, of the extent of difference between
one and the other, must be presented as background to the analysis.
The starting point is the responsibility vested in the SEC for the "accomplishment" of the federal regulatory policies embodied in the statutes committed to its administration. 7 According to Professor Schwartz,
"[e]specially significant in this respect is the affirmative duty ....to ensure
that the terms of [the federal securities laws] are in fact complied with and to
ferret out violators." 8 The performance of that duty involves policy determination by requests for supplemental statutory provisions, by implementary
rulemaking, by statutory and regulatory interpretation, and by prosecution
of persons whose conduct is not in accord with the law and rules as so
interpreted.
The SEC's policymaking through the exercise of its quasi-legislative function 9 is occasional in time and interstitial in coverage. By contrast, its policymaking through exercise of its quasi-executive function is quotidian,
addressing in interpretations a myriad of varying contexts and problems.
The quasi-legislative implements are few: legislative submissions to Congress, statutory drafts, explanatory transmittals, section-by-section analyses,
pre-rulemaking concept releases, rule proposing and reproposing releases,
and rule adoptions with explanations included. The quasi-executive instrumentalities, by contrast, are many: staff letters commenting on filed material,
staff presentations and responses at professional conferences, staff interpretive and "no action" letters, staff accounting bulletins, staff and certain Commission public studies and reports, Commission and certain staff interpretive
releases, amicus briefs, complaints and consent stipulations in prosecutory
proceedings brought in federal courts, orders instituting administrative proceedings, SEC-accepted consent orders making findings in those proceedings
based on offers of settlement, appellate briefs, responses to congressional and
White House inquiries, testimony before congressional committees, and, recently, SEC press releases, among others.
It is only to be expected, therefore, that the emphasis is heavily on quasiexecutive interpretation for enunciation of applicable policy, because the
6. BROWNLOW COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 222 (Study Report of Robert E.
Cushman, The Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions).
7. Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Justice and Its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1390, 1406 (1955).
8. Id. at 1408.
9. I use the term "quasi-legislative function" to include not only rulemaking, but also the
crafting and submission to Congress of prospective additions to the existing statutory canon.
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statutory provisions that the SEC enforces and the implementary rules it
adopts
are not and cannot be as clear and precise as a promissory note or
bill of sale. They necessarily describe in general terms, and with
emphasis upon tendency or effect, those practices which are forbidden. It is and must be left to the [SEC acting in its quasi-executive
capacity] to apply these general prohibitions to a great variety of
conduct. As this is done, it is expected that the general terms will
take on concreteness and that subsidiary principles may be worked
out by which certain types of conduct will be known as improper
and others as permissible. l
Every observer of the SEC accepts that these powers of policy determination and policy implementation-both the quasi-executive and the quasi-legislative powers-"must be exercised consistently and, therefore, by the same
body, not only to realize the public purposes which the statutes are designed
to further but also to avoid confusion of private interests."II My concern
12
arises when programmatic consistency infects the determination of cases
heard by the Commission in its role as appellate tribunal from decisions of
administrative law judges (ALJs) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.'"
My experience suggests that consistency in SEC quasi-executive and
quasi-legislative policymaking has assumed an increasingly self-generative
and self-vindicative character, demanding the ratification afforded by the
quasi-judicial process with its appearance of disinterestedness. Ultimately,
in my view, the more consistency the SEC as a body achieves in application
of administrative policies, the more committed the SEC as a body becomes
to vindication, in whatever capacity it is acting, of the policies thus consistently applied.
Perhaps my concerns will be best presented by hypothetical illustrations.
I consider the following three situations.
The first is a hypothetical illustrating substantive specifics. The SEC requires amendments to Schedule 13D' 4 to be filed "promptly" under Rule
13d-2.' 5 For a fairly long while, the regulated community and its lawyers
10. SENATE COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1941) [hereinafter

IN GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES, S. Doc.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT].

11. Id. at 58.
12. I use the word "cases" deliberately to invoke echoes of Article III.
13. The SEC also decides appeals from the decisions of the highest internal disciplinary

organs of the several self-regulatory organizations. Some of the same concerns apply to the
process for deciding those appeals, but the cases heard by the administrative law judges place
those concerns in starker relief.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1992).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (1992); see, e.g., In re Livingston, Exchange Act Release
No. 31,785, 53 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 625, 1993 SEC LEXIS 136, *8(Jan. 28, 1993).
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believed that promptness was determined by analogy to the ten days allowed
in the statute itself for the filing of the initial Schedule 13D. 16 The consent
order in In re CooperLaboratories,Inc. put an end to that belief.' 7 One year
later, in In re Revlon, Inc., 18 the SEC determined in a closely related context
that, when the wire was tripped no later than a late Thursday evening,
promptness required a filing on a Schedule 14D-9, at least from New York,
not later than Monday before the market opening. Revlon, like Cooper, was
initiated administratively and determined by consent order. I note, and underscore, that senior SEC staff, and even commissioners, have repeatedly
lectured on the mandates of Cooper and Revlon. 19
In a different, but not wholly dissimilar context, courts have analyzed the
speed with which companies have publicized operational developments in
their businesses, as opposed to tactical developments in their tender offers,
and have focused on the absence of undue delay in a multi-step review process as a criterion for promptness. A variation of that focus has been
presented to the SEC in the "Wells submission" context2 ° relating to Schedule 13D amendments and, consistent with the prior SEC actions arising out
of takeovers, has been rejected when presented.
How does the Commission-not the staff, but the Commission-now react when, hypothetically, upon appeal of an ALJ decision in a matter in
which the same argument was rejected at the Wells stage, the argument that
no undue delay was involved in a seven-day multi-step review of a crucial
Schedule 13D amendment, briefed and orally argued in a quasi-judicial
context?
16. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n-(d)(1) (1992).
17. See In re Cooper Lab., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-22171, 33 S.E.C. Docket
(CCH) 647 (June 26, 1985). In Cooper, the SEC expressed the view that "the promptness of an
amendment to a Schedule 13D must be judged in light of all the facts and circumstances of a
particular situation, [and] '[a]ny delay beyond the time the amendment reasonably could have
been filed may not be deemed to be [prompt].'" Id. at 651.
18. In re Revlon, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, 1986 SEC LEXIS 1368 (June
16, 1986).
19. See e.g., Daniel L. Goetzer et al., Disclosure Issues in Contests for Corporate Control,
in HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1988: THE NEW MARKET ENVIRONMENT 227 (1988); Daniel L. Goetzer et al, Recent Developments in Tender Offer
Regulation, in 2 HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1990 465 (1990); see
also Complaint, In Re Allied Stores Corp., No. 3-6869, 1987 WL 222242 (SEC).
20. "Wells submission" is a procedure by which a person, whom the SEC enforcement
staff has advised "may be the subject of a recommendation by the staff to the Commission that
law enforcement action be taken, may submit a written statement to the [enforcement] division
explaining why no ... action should be brought against him or her.... The staff forwards the
Wells Submission to the Commissioners [for their consideration] in conjunction with its own
memorandum recommending the enforcement action ....
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Policy, Securities Act Release No. 6974, 53 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 564, 569 (Jan. 22, 1993).
The Wells submission procedures are set forth at 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (1992).
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The second situation is a hypothetical that shifts from the specifics of violation of a single rule to the programmatically general: For most of the first
twenty years of its life, the jurisprudence of Rule lOb-6 21 characterized the
rule as objective, i.e., as one of those anti-fraud rules "which concentrate on
the general adverse effect of [specified] practices on the public, as distinguished from whether, in given cases, there is claimed absence of harm or of
evil motivation.",22 The reasoning behind this gloss on the rule, originated
by the SEC, was quite pragmatic: given the context in which Rule lOb-6 is
most frequently applied, the SEC has always believed that the rule has to
function automatically in order for it to function effectively.
It therefore became a part of SEC lore that a Rule lOb-6 violation requires
no intent. That the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder23 purported to find a scienter requirement in Section 10(b)24 was troublesome, but
there was no recession by the SEC with respect to Rule lOb-6 as opposed to
Rule lOb-5. The SEC knew what it had intended in 1956 and thereafter, and
it never changed that position.
Just to be safe, when Rule lOb-6 amendments were adopted in 1987, but
without ever drawing attention to the addition, the SEC added an additional
FederalRegister authority source2 5 for Rule lOb-6: Section 15(c)(2). 26 Section 15(c)(2) contains "means reasonably designed" language,2 7 which is absent from Section 10(b).
Now, how does the Commission-not the staff, but the Commissionreact when, upon appeal of an ALJ decision in a matter in which the same
conclusion was rejected at the Wells stage, the argument that some form of
21. Rule 10b-6 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person
...directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce .. .to bid for or purchase for any account in which he [or she] has a
beneficial interest, any security which is the subject of such distribution, or any security of the same class and series, or any right to purchase any such security, or to
attempt to induce any person to purchase any such security or right ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a) (1992).

22. EZRA WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 93
(1965).
23. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1992).
25. Exchange Act Release No. 24003, 37 S.E.C. Docket 602, 1987 WL 111649 (S.E.C.)
(Jan. 16, 1987).
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (1992).
27. Construing this same language as added to Securities Exchange Act Sec. 14(e) by a
1970 amendment, the Supreme Court stated: "The amendment gives the Securities and Exchange Commission latitude to regulate nondeceptive activities as a 'reasonably designed'
means of preventing manipulative acts, without suggesting any change in the meaning of the
term 'manipulative' itself." Schreiber v. Burlington Northern Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11 n.11 (1985).
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scienter was required to find a manipulation, is briefed and orally argued in a
quasi-judicial context?
The third, and last hypothetical moves from the direct to the leveraged
application. The House Banking Committee in 1988, as part of the legislative history of FIRREA,2" responded to the approach of several principally
Washington lawyers. The Committee made clear, in a special addition to
the Committee Report on FIRREA, that it was appropriate, and within the
responsible performance of their professional function, for lawyers to render
advice to their clients that the applicable regulatory agency positions on
whatever issue happened to be under dispute were simply incorrect or without statutory foundation and that, absent special circumstances, such advice
could be wrong but should not be grounds for regulatory prosecution of the
lawyers. 2 9 FIRREA, as passed in 1989, was changed in many substantive
ways, but the House Banking Committee Report is an important interpretive
aid.
In 1990, the SEC amended its own prior legislative proposals to request of
Congress the present Section 21C of the Exchange Act, a° subjecting to SEC
"cease and desist" prosecution any person, including a lawyer, who causes
(in the sense of "contributes to") a violation. The scope of the language of
the SEC's statutory amendment quietly extended the scope of the SEC's enforcement authority so that it would apply in the very circumstances that
had been in the House Banking Committee's consideration two years earlier,
i.e., to include lawyers giving exactly the sort of advice to which the House
Banking Committee referred. The draftspersons at the SEC were well aware
of FIRREA's history as they composed the statutory summary and sectionby-section analysis, and specifically, were aware of the House Banking Committee Report insert. Conspicuous by its absence in the 1990 Act or its legislative history-which, in this context at least, adopted almost verbatim what
the SEC had approved without public discussion and had submitted to the
congressional committees-is any analogue to the House Banking Committee Report language.
In the past, the SEC has often cited Judge Friendly's reference in United
States v. Benjamin 31 to the crowbar-like destructive capability of lawyers'
advice.32 Recently, the commissioners and the senior staff of the SEC have
28. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1989)).
29. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 291, 467 (1988).
30. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(c), Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 939
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1990)).
31. 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
32. In Benjamin, Judge Friendly wrote: "In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than
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stood squarely behind Judge Sporkin's indictment in Lincoln Savings two
years ago: "Where were the lawyers?" 3 Only one week before this Essay
was first delivered, the SEC's then-general counsel credited the SEC with
self-restraint in acting against lawyers (and, curiously, keyed that self-restraint to the reciprocal self-restraint of the Bar). 4
The leverage in prosecuting lawyers is well-known to every division of the
SEC. The temptation to discipline those who debase our mutual profession
is magnified by the temptation to multiply programmatic achievements
through prosecution of those whose SEC-contradicting advice is limited in
scope only by their sales ability to reach prospective clients.
Now does the Commission-not the staff, but the Commission-react
when, hypothetically, upon appeal of an ALJ decision in a matter in which
the same argument was rejected at the Wells stage, the argument, that there
must be room under Section 21 C for honest lawyers' disagreement with SEC
positions, however strongly held, without liability for contributing to a client's violation is briefed and orally argued in a quasi-judicial context?
The three foregoing illustrations are constructed to focus on different portions of the SEC's policy formulation and policy administration. They are
constructed to bring attention to the inertial force of SEC staff attitudes that
develop into written interpretive law or "no action" positions, then are incorporated into illustrative footnotes in SEC releases, then are cited in amicus briefs, and, finally, are inhaled or imbibed by commissioners as received
wisdom with long genealogy.
These illustrations are also intended to focus upon the expansive force of
individual SEC policy positions that are taken in the heat of abusive market
contexts, undoubtedly for the benefit of investors, are then gradually extended to a different market issue, and then another, without analysis of how
far from the original context the underlying reasoning has been scretched.
They are further intended to examine the function both of prosecutory
orders or complaints and of settlements, whether by judicial or administrative order, in setting forth the SEC's view of the law as a guide to lawyers' advice and regulatees' conduct, but not as precedent in any stare decisis
sense.
the chisel or the crowbar." Id. at 863. For Commission decisions citing to Judge Friendly's
quote, see, e.g., In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 292,
298 n.21 (Feb. 28, 1981).
33. The relevant text of Judge Sporkin's opinion is as follows: "The questions that must
be asked are: Where were these professionals...?... Where also were the outside accountants
and attorneys ... ?" Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn. v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C.
1990) (Sporkin, J.).
34. James R. Doty, Remarks at New York University Law School (Sept. 15, 1992) (notes
on file with Author).
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They are intended as well to bring attention to the effect of the
prosecutory process itself as that process has been affected by the Sunshine
Act 35 and by the Wells process. The more complex the matter, and the
broader the scope of likely impact of the proposed charges or the proposed
settlement, the deeper is the likely involvement of individual commissioners
and the more lengthy and probing is the likely pre-approval discussion at the
commissioner's table.
Finally, these three illustrations are intended to avoid any issues that may
be identified with any specific cases decided between 1986 and 1992.
Two concerns are intertwined in the analysis both of the illustrations and
of their implications. The first is the overlapping, if not the intermixture, of
prosecuting and judging.
Even when determining that such overlapping or intermixture is constitutional, the Supreme Court suggested a continuing alertness for what it
called "special insights into local realities" of the particular multi-functional
body.3 6 Seventeen and a half years have passed since then, seventeen years
of evolution, of agenda multiplication, of the declining sensitivity borne of
simple overexposure, and of the increasing commitment born of habit and
self-assurance.
The local realities are clearly not the same as they were in 1975. The
question is: Have they merely evolved or have they generically altered? Can
we refute today, as we believed we could convincingly seventeen years ago,
what concerned the members of the pre-war Attorney General's Committee:
the perception by an affected respondent "that, in this combination of functions within [the SEC or any other of the tri-functional agencies], he has lost
37
all opportunity to argue his case to an unbiased [commission]"?
The second concern-and they are indeed intertwined-is the impairment, if not the envelopment, of the adjudicative function by the policymaking role. 38 In repeatedly asking "How does the Commission-not the staff,
but the Commission-now react?," it is at the commissioners as individual
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
36. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975).
37. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 204 (Additional
Views and Recommendations of Messrs. McFarland, Stason, and Vanderbilt); see also American Conference of United States, Rec. No. 86-4, The Split Enforcement Model for Agency
Adjudication, reprinted in 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-4 (1991) ("[T]he experience with internal separation of functions has never entirely silenced the critics who argue that it is impossible to
achieve evenhanded justice when enforcement and adjudicative functions are lodged in the
same agency.").
38. Cf Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S.Ct. 1171 (1991) (holding that, under a split enforcement
agency model, an adjudicatory Commission must defer to the Secretary when both the Commission and the Secretary offer reasonable but conflicting interpretations of an ambiguous
regulation).
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human beings that I look to seek some indication of an institutionalized appreciation of undertaking, or some indication of an institutionalized effort to
discharge, a substantively different role in the adjudicative area.
The effort that adjudication requires of each commissioner is almost impossible to make in the absence of institutional incentive, and perhaps institutional pressure, to individual insight into the extent of crystallization of
personal attitudes in support of prevailing policy interpretations. For lack of
that insight, as the Brownlow Committee noted, "[t]he discretionary [policyoriented] work of the administrator is merged with that of the judge,",3 9 to
the rapid and potentially total eclipse of the latter.
When applied to the initiation of prosecutions as a tool for the further
consistent implementation of policy, the commitment to consistent vindication of policies is understandable and, in my view, appropriate. The SEC
should be expected to prosecute, and even in some instances to stretch somewhat to prosecute, those persons whose conduct is not in accord with the
SEC's interpretation of the law.
By contrast, I believe there ought to be a clear attitudinal distinction in
the discharge of quasi-judicial responsibilities; a withdrawal by the SEC in
the performance of adjudicatory duties from those "[p]ressures and influences properly directed toward officers responsible for formulating and administering policy"; 4 0 and a de novo review not only of the case record but
also of applicable law, of analogous practice and other relevant materials,
and, above all, of fundamental (and therefore neutral) principles of administrative law relevant to the case at bar, undertaken in a manner as distinct
from the manner in which the quasi-executive and quasi-legislative functions
are usually performed, in a manner as close as attainable to what has been
called the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge."4
If we agree only that the issue of fairness and the appearance of fairness
are fundamental to the discharge of its adjudicatory responsibility by any
regulatory agency, 42 then my concern comes down to this: first and foremost
39. BROWNLOW COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40

40. Id.
41. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1409.
42. See, e.g., Administrative Conference of the United States, Rec. No. 91-8, Adjudication
of Civil Penalties Under the Federal Aviation Act, reprinted in 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-8 (1992)
("The regulated community has concerns about the fairness of FAA's administration of...
[its] ... program, resulting from the fact that appeals of ... [those] ... cases are heard by the
FAA Administrator."); cf Rec. No. 86-4, supra note 37 ("Fairness is an important but an
unquantifiable and subjective value."); H. REP. No. 671, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992) ("[W]e
are unwilling to change the procedures of the . . . program on the basis of perceptions of
unfairness, when these perceptions have no basis in reality. We will of course continue to
oversee the. . . program and if unfairness develops[,] ... we will not hesitate to take appropri-

ate corrective action.").
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among the "local realities" 43 heightening the "risk of unfairness"' in an
SEC adjudication is that, by exercising to the fullest its constitutionally permitted power to sit in judgment on cases in which the construction of applicable law turns on policy-oriented interpretation of its own making, "the
[SEC] itself. . . maintains a vested interest in ensuring that a particular
result is reached, that particular policies are protected or advanced"4 5 under
the guise of adjudication.
Put more harshly, it would be neither untruthful nor unsympathetic to the
SEC to conclude, as the Brownlow Committee Report suggested, that the
risk of unfairness has, in fact, been magnified, and that the "policies ...
determined by a body also doing judicial work"46 have, in fact, affected that
part of its decisionmaking in a manner "demoralizing the impartiality of the
judge."4 7 It would not be untruthful, as reflected in the selection of matters
by the SEC for administrative prosecution as opposed to prosecution in an
Article III court. And it would not be unsympathetic because, in the final
analysis, one can only expect the reality of that unhappy conclusion to become evident, sooner than later, to the federal appellate judges in appeals
from SEC adjudicatory decisions and once evident, to "touch a sensitive judicial nerve" 48 with repercussions unfortunate for the very policies to whose
consistent promotion the SEC's processes of administrative justice have been
bent.
Perhaps in light of Chevron and its progeny, that sensitive judicial nerve is
forever beyond the constitutional touching. But even if so, as the SEC itself
has on more than one occasion written in decisions under the Exchange Act,
we have it on the high authority of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that "much
which should offend a free-spirited society is constitutional."49
Fairness it is to which the SEC, like all government agencies, should aspire. It is fairness and the appearance of fairness we admire and whose absence we deplore in the functioning of a government agency. And,
unhappily, it is fairness and the appearance of fairness that are left behind
when the SEC bends its adjudicatory responsibilities to the services of its
policymaking function. When that happens-and my J'accuse is that it has
43. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975); see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
44. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58.
45. George R. Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model. Some Conclusions from the
OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 344 (1987).
46. BROWNLOW COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 222 (Study Report of Robert E.
Cushman).
47. Id.
48. Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the FederalAdministrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 767 n.41 (1981).
49. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 670 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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happened-at the SEC, then it appears that "the prime aim of [the SEC's]
administrative justice is, paradoxically, not justice at all, but the execution of
the legislative policy" 5 to which the SEC owes its political existence.

50. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1406.

